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“The genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it
may have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems
and present needs.” – Justice William Brennan Jr.
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INTRODUCTION
In a dramatic shift for an institution that has repeatedly endorsed
capital punishment, the United States Supreme Court ruled 6-3 in a
landmark decision that executing persons with mental retardation
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishment.”1 Rather than taking the Court’s preferred method of
deciding death penalty cases on an incremental case-by-case basis, the
Court categorically held all executions of mentally retarded persons
unconstitutional.2
Although the Constitution does not define or provide guidance on
the meaning of “cruel and unusual,”3 it appears that the drafters
intended the provision to prohibit, at a minimum, the forms of
punishment banned at the time the Constitution was drafted.4
During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court construed the
Eighth Amendment to go beyond merely prohibiting those forms of
punishment that were outlawed in colonial times.5 The Court
decided that “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society”6 should dictate what is considered “cruel and
unusual.”7 The phrase “evolving standards of decency” introduced an
1. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.”); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(determining that excessive punishment “must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain” and “must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime”).
2. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that executions of mentally retarded
persons violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Kenneth W. Starr, The Anthrax
Term, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A12 (noting that the Court held all executions of
the mentally retarded as forbidden, regardless of the surrounding circumstances).
3. See Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to
Death: Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally
Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 922 (2001) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment but offers no
definition or explanation of the phrase).
4. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (“There is now little room
for doubt that the Eighth [Amendment] . . . embraces, at a minimum, those modes
or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted.”).
5. See id. at 406 (highlighting that the Eighth Amendment is not solely limited
to practices condemned by common law in 1789).
6. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910) (declaring that the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflects
contemporary values).
7. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (finding that
the Eighth Amendment is to be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner that
reflects society’s evolving standards of decency); see also Larry Eichel, ‘Constitutional’
Now May Be ‘Unconstitutional’ in Future, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, June 26, 2002, at A15
(reporting that what is usual and constitutional in one era can become unusual and
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expansion of Eighth Amendment analysis that allowed contemporary
law and moral standards to determine what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.8 Courts, reviewing cases under such evolving
standards, should arrive at a national consensus that is based on
objective factors, the clearest and most reliable of which is state
legislation.9
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Ernest McCarver
in order to decide whether national standards have evolved such that
executing a person with mental retardation would violate the Eighth
Amendment.10 The Court later dismissed the case as moot because
North Carolina passed legislation that prohibited the execution of
mentally retarded offenders.11 Soon after the dismissal, the Court
granted certiorari to Daryl Atkins on the same issue, suggesting that
the Court was ready to reevaluate its position on the constitutionality
of such executions.12
This Note will discuss the constitutionality of executing persons
with mental retardation as highlighted in the Supreme Court
decision, Atkins v. Virginia.13 Part I will discuss the case’s facts and
procedural history, as well as the case history that played a role in the
Atkins decision.14 Part II will provide a critical legal analysis of the
Supreme Court’s majority holding, its reasoning, and the dissenting
opinions.15 This section will discuss the establishment of a national
thus unconstitutional in another).
8. See Oliver Kaufman, Atkins v. Virginia: Is Executing the Mentally Retarded
Constitutional?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 579, 582 (2001) (noting that the examination of
evolving standards of decency expanded the cruel and unusual punishment clause to
apply practices that society formerly accepted, but currently finds repugnant); see also
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (stating that future generations of
judges will define the contours of cruel and unusual punishment).
9. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.7 (acknowledging that “our capital
punishment jurisprudence has consistently recognized that contemporary standards,
as reflected by the actions of legislatures . . . provide an important measure of
whether the death penalty is ‘cruel and unusual’”).
10. See McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
11. See McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (noting that the
legislation’s retroactive effect eliminated McCarver’s standing to bring his case before
the U.S. Supreme Court); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005 (2002) (providing that
“notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant who is mentally
retarded shall be sentenced to death”).
12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 533 U.S. 976 (2001) (granting certiorari); see also
Aimee D. Borromeo, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
175, 197 (2002) (conjecturing that “it is unlikely [that the Supreme Court] would
grant certiorari if their objective was simply to restate the holding of Penry”). Penry v.
Lynaugh held that executions of persons with mental retardation do not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id.
13. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
14. See infra Part I, notes 20-50 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II, notes 51-86 and accompanying text.
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consensus prohibiting executions of persons with mental retardation
and offer additional justification for finding such executions a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.16 Part II will also analyze the
predictability of the Supreme Court Justices’ decisions.17 Part III will
address the implications of this decision on states’ administration of
the death penalty and provide a recommendation of the type of
legislation states should enact in order to comply with the Court’s
holding.18 Finally, the Note will conclude that, despite a few
inconsistencies between the decision and past precedent, the Court
correctly determined that executions of persons with mental
retardation are “cruel and unusual punishments,” and thus violate the
Eighth Amendment.19
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Procedural History
On the afternoon of August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins and his
friend, William A. Jones, abducted Eric Nesbitt, a twenty-one-year-old
Langley Air Force Base Airman.20 The two men robbed Nesbitt of his
money and transported him to an isolated location where he was
killed as a result of eight gunshot wounds.21
Atkins corroborated most of the stipulated facts, but contradicted
the assertion that he murdered Nesbitt.22 Despite his plea of not
guilty, the jury convicted Atkins of abduction, armed robbery, and
capital murder and sentenced him to death.23 On appeal, Atkins did

16. See infra Part II, notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part II, notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part III, notes 133-65 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Conclusion, notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
20. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 449 (Va. 1999), aff’d, 534
S.E.2d 312 (Va. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21. See Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 446 (recounting that Atkins and Jones abducted
Nesbitt at gunpoint in the parking lot of a convenience store). They proceeded to
steal his money, drive to an ATM to withdraw more money, and kill him in the
parking lot of a nearby school. Id.
22. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002) (emphasizing that Atkins
testified that Jones killed Nesbitt); see also id. at 308 n.1 (noting that initially both
Jones and Atkins were indicted for capital murder). The prosecution, however,
allowed Jones to plea bargain, protecting him from the death penalty in exchange for
his testimony against Atkins. Id.
23. See id. at 307, 308 n.2 (pointing out that Atkins’ incoherent testimony, that
was substantially inconsistent with the statement he gave to the police upon his arrest,
proved highly damaging to his credibility). Jones, on the other hand, offered
coherent and credible testimony and had declined to make an initial statement to the
authorities. Id. at 308 n.2.
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not argue that his punishment was excessive or disproportionate;
rather, he claimed he should not be sentenced to death on the
grounds that he is mentally retarded.24 The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, but remanded the case to the trial court for a
new penalty proceeding because the jury received an improper
verdict form.25 The verdict form did not inform jurors of the option
of sentencing Atkins to life imprisonment upon a finding that the
prosecution did not prove “aggravating factors”26 beyond a reasonable
doubt.27 On remand, a new jury convicted Atkins and sentenced him
to death.28 On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision.29 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
because of the gravity of the concerns of the dissenters in the Virginia
Supreme Court, and the apparent nationwide legislative shift in
treatment of this issue.30 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reversed
the decision and held executions of persons with mental retardation
to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel
and unusual punishment.”31
24. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d at 318, rev’d, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(stating that Atkins did not argue that his death sentence was disproportionate to the
penalties imposed for crimes similar to the one he committed). Atkins asserted that
his mental retardation precluded a death sentence because the death penalty had not
been imposed on any defendant in Virginia with an IQ score comparable to his. Id.
25. See Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 456-57; see also Whaley v. Commonwealth, 200
S.E.2d 556, 558 (Va. 1973) (holding that “when the principle of law is materially vital
to [a] defendant in a criminal case, it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse a
defective instruction instead of correcting it and giving it in the proper form”).
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2001) (stating that the two
aggravating factors in Virginia capital cases are future dangerousness and vileness of
the offense); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307-08 (noting that to prove the two
aggravating factors, the state introduced evidence of Atkins’ prior felony convictions,
testimony of previous victims, and pictures of the deceased).
27. See Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 456-57 (reporting that the improper verdict form
was incomplete and did not comport with the correct statement of law that the trial
court gave to the jury in its first instruction).
28. See Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 314 (reporting that the jury decided death was a
proper sentence because there was a probability that Atkins would commit future acts
of violence, constituting a continuing threat to society, and that his conduct in
committing the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman”).
29. See id. at 321 (holding that Atkins’ sentence was neither excessive nor
disproportionate). In addition, the Virginia Supreme Court held that they were not
willing to change Atkins’ sentence based on his IQ score because two experts testified
at trial that Atkins could appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Id.
30. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310; see also Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 324 (Hassell and
Koontz, J.J., dissenting) (declaring that the imposition of a death sentence upon a
defendant with the mental age of a child between the ages of nine and twelve is
excessive). “It is indefensible to conclude that individuals who are mentally retarded
are not to some degree less culpable for their criminal acts.” Id. at 325.
31. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“[In] construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment [according to] our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore
conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a
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B. Mental Retardation
At both trials, Atkins’ defense counsel introduced evidence of
Atkins’ mental capabilities as a mitigating factor.32 Dr. Evan Nelson, a
forensic psychologist who had evaluated Atkins before trial,
concluded that he was “mildly mentally retarded.”33 He based his
conclusion on interviews with people who knew Atkins, a review of
school and court records, and the administration of a standard
intelligence test that indicated Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine.34
Atkins’ IQ places him in a class of individuals that constitutes less than
3% of the population.35
The American Association of Mental Retardation (“AAMR”)
describes mental retardation as a substantial limitation in present
functioning.36 It is a condition that places limits on a person’s
conceptual, practical, and social intelligence.37 It is characterized by
significantly
sub-average
intellectual
functioning,
existing
concurrently with limitations in two or more of the following skill
areas: “communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community
substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded
offender.”).
32. See Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 451-52 (noting that Dr. Evan Nelson testified as to
Atkins’ low IQ and urged a sentence of life imprisonment, rather than a death
sentence, based on Atkins’ diminished mental capabilities); see also Atkins, 534
S.E.2d at 319 (observing that Dr. Nelson testified that Atkins’ death sentence should
be reversed based on Atkins’ mental retardation). In Virginia, the mental retardation
of a defendant is a factor to be considered in mitigation of capital murder. Id. at 31920.
33. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 (reporting that Dr. Nelson testified that Atkins’
low IQ and inability to function normally classified him as mildly mentally retarded);
see also Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 323 (stating that mild mental retardation encompasses
those with an IQ range of fifty-five and seventy).
34. See Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321-22 (noting that Atkins was put in classes for slow
learners with intensive instruction for remedial deficits, never graduated from high
school, and never held a job or lived on his own). Atkins’ low IQ revealed a mental
age of a child between the ages of nine and twelve. Id.
35. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5 (citing 2 BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A.
SADOCK, KAPLAN & SADOCK’S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2952 (7th ed.
2000) (stating that it is estimated that 1-3% of the U.S. population has an IQ between
seventy and seventy-five or lower, and thus can be deemed mentally retarded).
36. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, CLASSIFICATION IN
MENTAL RETARDATION 11 (H. Grossman ed., 1983) [hereinafter AAMR I] (defining
mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period”).
37. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS xi (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
AAMR II] (describing how many individuals with mental retardation have poor
impulse control, limited communication skills, lack of knowledge of basic
information, and a proneness to be influenced by others).
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use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and
work.”38 Mental retardation manifests before age eighteen and is
classified into the following degrees of severity: mild, moderate,
severe, and profound.39 Like Atkins, the majority of mentally
retarded individuals fall within the mild classification.40
C. Case History: Penry v. Lynaugh
The Virginia Supreme Court rejected Atkins’ assertion that
executions of persons with mental retardation are unconstitutional.41
The court defended its holding by relying on Penry v. Lynaugh.42 In
Penry, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not
preclude the execution of a mentally retarded person convicted of a
capital offense.43
Penry argued that his mental status should preclude his execution,
because a death sentence would be disproportionate to his degree of
culpability.44
He relied on the reasoning in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,45 which held that a juvenile is less culpable than an adult
38. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 3 (citing AAMR II, supra note 37, at 5).
39. See Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 323 (citing SADOCK & SADOCK, supra note 35, at
2598). “Mild” mental retardation describes individuals with an IQ ranging from fifty
to sixty-nine and a mental age between nine and twelve. Id. “Moderate” mental
retardation describes individuals with an IQ of thirty-five to forty-nine and a mental
age between six and nine. Id. “Severe” mental retardation describes individuals with
an IQ of twenty to thirty-four and a mental age between three and six. Id.
“Profound” mental retardation describes individuals with an IQ lower than twenty
and a mental age lower than three. Id.
40. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 1994) (reporting eighty-five percent of the
population of mentally retarded individuals have “mild” mental retardation). Ten
percent of the population has “moderate” mental retardation. Id. Three to four
percent of the population has “severe” mental retardation. Id. One to two percent of
the population has “profound” mental retardation. Id.
41. See Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 321 (affirming the lower court’s decision that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution of defendants with mental
retardation).
42. See 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see also Kaufman, supra note 8, at 581 (reporting
that Penry was the only Supreme Court case to examine the issue of precluding
executions of the mentally retarded).
43. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (noting that the Court did not make a categorical
rule that executions of the mentally retarded are prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment). However, the Court did hold that a suspect was entitled to an
instruction that would allow the jury to consider evidence of mental retardation as a
mitigating factor in imposing a sentence. Id. at 340.
44. See id. at 336 (reporting Penry’s assertion that because he had the
intelligence of a seven-year-old, he had a lower degree of culpability).
45. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion) (setting aside the death sentence
of a sixteen-year old). Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun held that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of a person who
was under the age of sixteen at the time of his or her offense. Id. Justice O’Connor
filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the judgment on the narrow ground that
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for the same crime.46 The Court found juveniles less culpable than
adults based on the notion that society reserves the harshest criminal
sentence for only the most culpable offenders, and juveniles possess a
lower capacity than adults to control their conduct.47
However, the Court’s holding in Penry focused on the lack of a
national consensus that would preclude such executions as a matter of
law.48 While Penry argued that numerous public opinion polls
established a national consensus, the Court found that public
sentiment expressed in the polls would need to be incorporated into
legislation to provide an objective representation of public opinion.49
Penry was significant because the Court’s language left the door open
to future challenges to the Eighth Amendment.50
II. COURT’S ANALYSIS: NATIONAL CONSENSUS OR SIX-PERSON OPINION?
A. Majority Opinion
Since Penry, several state judges have perceived a national trend
towards exempting the mentally retarded from capital punishment,
and have thus concluded that such executions constitute “cruel and
unusual punishments.”51 In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
the state could not execute the petitioner under the Oklahoma statute because the
statute did not specify a minimum age for capital punishment. Id. at 857-58
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 834-35 (reasoning that executions of sixteen-year-olds were
unconstitutional because of distinctions society draws between adult and juvenile
behavior). A juvenile is “not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult.”
Id. at 825. Society assumes that adolescents do not act as adults do and thus restricts
their choices and actions until they reach an age where they can appreciate the value
of their decisions. Id. at 825 n.23.
47. See id. at 825 n.23 (highlighting that “it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual,
to impose on a child a punishment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully,
rational, choosing agent”).
48. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35 (holding that two states’ and the federal
government’s ban of executions of the mentally retarded did not provide a national
consensus that would categorically prohibit such executions under the Eighth
Amendment).
49. See id. (noting that these poll results may someday find representation in
legislation, but that the poll results themselves are not objective indicators of
contemporary social values). Rather, judgments of jurors and legislatures are
objective factors that the Court can rely on in determining the existence of a national
consensus. Id. at 335.
50. See id. at 334, 340 (concluding that a national consensus had not been
established against execution of the mentally retarded because only two states had
prohibited it). However, Justice O’Connor, in the majority opinion, suggested that
this decision could be overruled at a later date if a national consensus were to
emerge. Id. at 340.
51. See, e.g., People v. Smithey, 978 P.2d 1171, 1224 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (asserting that Penry is no longer valid under the Eighth Amendment in
light of the legislative changes that have taken place since 1989).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/4

8

Hall: Atkins v. Virginia: National Consensus or Six-Person Opinion?
HALL.DOC

2004]

9/16/2004 2:05 PM

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

369

directly confronted the issue of whether a national consensus
condemning such executions had been established since it last
addressed the issue in Penry.52
The Supreme Court has applied “national consensus” standards
vaguely, with some cases relying on a strict legislative tally and others
encompassing a broader consideration of public opinion.53
Since the Court has never provided an explicit threshold for what
constitutes a national consensus, it is imperative to examine court
decisions that pertain to this issue.54
Since Penry was decided, sixteen states have abolished executions
of the mentally retarded.55 When added to the two states that banned

52. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307 (noting that the question presented by this case is
whether a national consensus deprives Virginia of the constitutional power to impose
the death penalty on capital murder defendants that are mentally retarded).
53. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830, 835 n.42 (utilizing recommendations from
psychiatrists, the American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute). But see
Penry, 492 U.S. at 331, 335 (arguing that the Court should look at legislative
enactments rather than opinion poll results in determining the existence of a
national consensus).
54. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(holding that administering the death penalty for the rape of a woman constituted
“cruel and unusual” punishment because only one state retained this practice); see
also Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: Capital Punishment and
the Mentally Retarded Defendant after Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 346
(2002) (highlighting that the Court did not provide a specific number of state
statutes required to establish a national consensus). Instead, the Court implemented
a method of comparing evidence of a national consensus to previous decisions. Id. at
347. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (finding that there
was no national consensus among the thirty-seven states whose laws permit capital
punishment: fifteen states decline to impose it on sixteen-year-old offenders and
twelve states decline to impose it on seventeen-year-old offenders), with Thompson,
487 U.S. at 829 (plurality opinion) (prohibiting capital punishment for juveniles
under the age of sixteen). Four judges held that a national consensus against
execution of individuals under the age of sixteen existed where eighteen states
expressly prohibited it. Id. Justice O’Connor filed a concurrence that set aside the
verdict on narrower grounds, but she did state that these eighteen states added to the
fourteen that outlaw capital punishment altogether could demonstrate a legislative
consensus. Id. at 849. “Strong counter-evidence would be required to persuade me
that a national consensus against this practice does not exist.” Id.
55. The sixteen states with statutes prohibiting the death penalty for persons with
mental retardation are: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(A) (2003);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-618(b) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-9-401-03
(West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(h)(2) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.137(2) (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-4623(d) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140(l) (Michie 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. §
565.030(4)(1) (West 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(b) (West 2002); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-105.01(2) (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2.1(b) (Michie
2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(c) (McKinney 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-27A-26.1 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (West 2002).
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such executions before 1990,56 the federal government’s
prohibition,57 and the twelve states that already outlaw capital
punishment,58 Atkins’ defense argued that a clear national consensus
expressing condemnation of death sentences for defendants with
mental retardation had been established.59
The Court ultimately agreed, but chose to defend its position by
holding that it was not so much the number of these states that was
significant, but the consistency in the direction of change.60 By doing
this, the Court departed from the strict legislative tally approach and
evaded having an exact number determine a national consensus.61
The Court correctly determined that the swift movement in state law
was even more convincing proof of a national consensus, given the
nature and quantity of such legislation.62
This argument is strengthened by the fact that legislatures that have
addressed this issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition.63 Even in states that permit such executions, the
practical evidence suggests that there is still a public consensus that
56. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (1988); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 412(f)(1)
(1989) (prohibiting the death penalty for persons with mental retardation in Georgia
and Maryland prior to 1990).
57. See Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (1994) (providing
that a “sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally
retarded”).
58. See Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?did=121&scid=11 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004) (reporting that Alaska,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin outlaw capital punishment).
59. See Brief for Petitioner at 40-44, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No.
00-8452) (asserting that the number of states prohibiting executions of mentally
retarded persons was indicative of a national consensus).
60. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; see also Brief for Petitioner at 41, Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452) (highlighting that, in a little more than a
decade, the number of states prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded grew
nine-fold); see also THE JUSTICE PROJECT, 2001 STATE LEGISLATION ON DEATH PENALTY
REFORM AT A GLIMPSE, available at http://justice.policy.net/relatives/20723.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2004) (noting that in 2001, six states introduced legislation
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded). This brought the total number
of states banning that practice to eighteen. Id.
61. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (using the legislative tally
approach to hold that two state prohibitions combined with the fourteen states that
outlaw capital punishment did not constitute sufficient evidence to establish a
national consensus).
62. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (highlighting that it is a well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for
persons guilty of violent crime). This fact coupled with the large number of states
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons, and the complete absence of
states passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions influenced
the Court’s determination of a national consensus. Id. at 315-16.
63. See id. at 314-15 (noting that beginning in 1990 sixteen states have passed
legislation banning executions of persons with mental retardation).
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executing persons with mental retardation is cruel and unusual.64
B. Flaws in the Majority’s Reasoning
In discerning a national consensus, courts have also held that the
actions of sentencing juries constitute objective factors.65 Analysis of
juries’ performance in this area is particularly difficult to conduct
because juries can and often do submit a decision without reference
to mitigating circumstances.66 Surprisingly, the Court in Atkins did
not acknowledge the actions of juries.67 The Court possibly avoided
the opportunity to include jury performance because the data is
difficult to gather and there was strong enough evidence in the
legislative history to establish a national consensus. However, the
Court should have stressed that the available data suggests that there
is a consensus among juries that executions of mentally retarded
persons violate the Eighth Amendment.68
Other compelling
64. See Brief for Petitioner at 43, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 008452) (stating that the Illinois legislature passed a bill protecting people with mental
retardation, but the governor vetoed the bill because he regarded the legislation as
unnecessary because mentally retarded individuals were not being executed in the
state); see, e.g., Governor’s message, Senate J., 1st. Legis. Sess., at SJ-218 (Or. 1993)
(reporting that the governor of Oregon vetoed legislation banning executions of the
mentally retarded because its language failed to accomplish that goal). “The original
intent of Senate bill 640 was to exempt mentally retarded individuals from the death
penalty. I wholeheartedly support that goal.” Id.; see, e.g., Veto Proclamation for
H.B. No. 236 (2001) (noting that the House and Senate in Texas passed a legislation
banning the execution of the mentally retarded, but that the Governor vetoed it due
to a procedural flaw). In his veto statement, Governor Perry did not express
dissatisfaction with the principle of categorically excluding the mentally retarded
from the death penalty. Id.; see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting that although
New Hampshire and New Jersey permit executions of the mentally retarded, both
states have not carried out such an execution in decades); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
Shouldn’t We, the People, Be Heard More Often by This High Court?, WASH. POST,
June 30, 2002, at B03 (reporting that since 1989, only five states have executed
convicts known to be mentally retarded).
65. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822, 831 (holding that the Court looked to state
statutes and the behavior of juries as objective factors in its determination of a
national consensus); see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(indicating that she would have considered the behavior of sentencing juries as
objective evidence had it been offered).
66. See Brief for Petitioner at 44 n.49, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(No. 00-8452).
67. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Court did not include any statistics to either prove or disprove
whether juries consider the death penalty a disproportionate punishment for
mentally retarded offenders).
68. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1564 (1998) (reporting that of the studies
conducted, mental retardation was listed as one of the most powerful mitigating
factors considered at the sentencing phase of a capital trial). Evidence that the
defendant was mentally retarded was almost as powerful as lingering doubt over his
guilt. Id. Among the jurors surveyed, 73.8% reported that the defendant’s mental
retardation would make them less likely to vote for death. Id.
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evidence not mentioned by the Court was that the boundary drawn in
Penry, between the levels of mental retardation, has been
abandoned.69
The decision in Atkins was also flawed because, in the Court’s
determination of a national consensus, the justices stepped out of the
tradition of looking to established objective factors, and placed
significance on public opinion polls as well as the views of religious
and psychological institutions.70 Although the Court in Atkins
correctly determined the existence of a national consensus, the
opinion would have been more persuasive had it relied solely on
objective factors rather than subjective, non-traditional ones.71
C. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Dissent
In an unusual act by a Supreme Court Justice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist expressed his extreme disapproval with the ruling by
omitting the word “respectfully” from his dissent.72 Although Chief
Justice Rehnquist failed to adhere to the majority opinion, he did
contribute some noteworthy observations.
Rehnquist properly
criticized the Court for citing to an international consensus,
discussing opinions of religious groups and psychological
organizations, and noting public opinion polls in its reasoning for
establishing a national consensus.73 The Court’s justification for
69. See Brief for Petitioner at 45 n.50, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(No. 00-8452) (highlighting that the Penry Court speculated that the group of people
ineligible for execution at common law corresponded to “severe” or “profound”
mental retardation, yet the modern consensus has abandoned such distinctions).
Since Penry, not a single state legislature has adopted a provision that treats
individuals with severe or profound mental retardation differently from others with
milder forms of mental retardation. Id.; see also AAMR II, supra note 37, at 34
(reporting that the mild/moderate/severe/profound classification model has been
abandoned).
70. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (indicating that the condemnation of
executions of persons with mental retardation as expressed by the American
Psychological Association, the representatives of widely diverse religious communities,
and widespread polling are factors the Court used in its determination of a national
consensus). But see Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (stressing the importance of looking to
only objective factors in determining a national consensus).
71. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (noting that legislative history and jury
determinations are objective factors to examine when determining a national
consensus), with id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (declaring that opinion
polls, religious institutions, and the international community’s viewpoint are
subjective criteria that have no bearing in the determination of a national consensus).
72. See id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Believing this view to be seriously
mistaken, I dissent.”).
73. See id. at 324-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating “I fail to see, however,
how the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide
any support for the Court’s ultimate determination”). He also noted that the Court
has explicitly rejected the use of sentencing practices of other countries to establish
an Eighth Amendment prerequisite that “a practice is accepted among our people.”

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol12/iss2/4

12

Hall: Atkins v. Virginia: National Consensus or Six-Person Opinion?
HALL.DOC

2004]

9/16/2004 2:05 PM

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA

373

relying on such factors is weak because it is a departure from the case
law established by Penry, and advanced by Justice O’Connor.74 Justice
Rehnquist specifically focused on the Court’s flawed reliance on
public opinion polls.75 The Court has rejected polling in past
decisions because polls capture Americans’ constantly changing views,
vary in the quality of information gathered, may be unfairly biased,
and suffer from a statistical margin of error.76 Even though
Rehnquist addressed the inconsistency between relying on public
opinion polls and complying with precedent, he failed to recognize
that data from legislatures is strong, compelling evidence of a national
consensus.77
D. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
In an unusual fashion, Justice Scalia expressed his outrage with the
majority opinion by reading his dissent from the bench.78 Joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia described
the majority opinion as a raw “assumption of power” that ignored the
will of the public and lawmakers in the twenty states that permit
Id. at 325. In addition, opinions of religious and psychological organizations as well
as public opinion polls, were expressly declined in Penry as objective factors to
consider when determining a national consensus. Id. at 326. Such factors should not
be relied on where the “public sentiment expressed in [them] had yet to find
expression in state law.” Id.
74. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (stressing that opinion polls should not be relied
upon because those public sentiments could ultimately find expression in legislation,
an objective indicator of contemporary values); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 377 (1989) (plurality opinion) (refusing to “rest constitutional law upon
such uncertain foundations” as “public opinion polls, the views of interest groups,
and the positions adopted by various professional organizations”).
75. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 326-27 (stressing that opinion polls should not be
considered as objective evidence because an extensive body of literature describes
how statistical errors often affect the reliability and validity of the polls).
76. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (rejecting polling data as a factor to consider in
determining a national consensus because of its subjective and uncertain nature); see
also John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 253 n.16 (1994) (noting that
reliability of survey responses is conditioned upon a variety of factors, including the
experience of a research organization, sample size and composition, question format,
question content, location of where the survey is administered, and length of survey);
see also Thomas R. Marshall, The Supreme Court and the Grass Roots: Whom Does
the Court Represent Best?, 76 JUDICATURE 22, 24 (1992) (reporting that modern
polling techniques under count some minority groups).
77. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s conclusion that the legislation of eighteen states barring executions of
persons with mental retardation constitutes a national consensus). Justice Rehnquist
failed to take into account that twelve states outlaw capital punishment altogether. Id.
78. See Charles Lane, Court Bars Execution of Mentally Retarded; 6 to 3 Ruling
Cites Ban in Death-Penalty States, WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at A01 (commenting
that the reading of a dissent from the bench is a gesture usually reserved for those
cases in which a justice disagrees especially strongly with the majority).
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executions of persons with mental retardation.79 Scalia ridiculed
Stevens’ national trend spotting as “embarrassingly feeble,” calling it
“a fudged forty-seven percent” consensus because twenty of the thirtyeight capital punishment states still permit executions of persons with
mental retardation.80 Scalia also accused the Court of creating a
national consensus in an effort to evade the legislative process.81
However, Justice Scalia’s reasoning failed to take into account that
twelve states outlaw capital punishment altogether.82 In fact, when all
fifty states are considered, along with the District of Columbia, a total
of thirty states, or sixty percent, outlaw the death penalty for
defendants with mental retardation.83 Justice Scalia’s omission of
states that do not permit capital punishment strikes against the very
notion of a “national consensus.”84
Justice Scalia’s dissent is also unpersuasive as a whole because he
fails to recognize precedent requiring that the Eighth Amendment
should be flexible in order to encompass evolving standards of
decency.85 Were it not for the constitutional notion of evolving
standards of decency, many practices this country views as abhorrent
would still exist.86
79. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338, 348 (remarking that “[s]eldom has an opinion of
this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its members”).
80. See id. at 343-45 (describing his disagreement with the finding of a national
consensus). In his response, Scalia offered the majority “the Prize for the Court’s
Most Feeble Effort to fabricate a ‘national consensus.’” Id. at 347.
81. See id. at 348 (stressing that the majority discovered an artificial national
consensus and used it to undermine the legislative process so as to promote the moral
judgment of “really good lawyers” as constitutional rule).
82. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 58 (listing the twelve states
that outlaw capital punishment).
83. See Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital
Punishment: State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 104 (1996) (opining that states that have no death
penalty should be considered in assessing a national consensus). For example,
Kansas passed legislation to re-impose capital punishment, but claimed the mentally
retarded as an exemption to the rule. Id. Before 1994, the Supreme Court would
not have counted Kansas in determining a national consensus but now it does. Id.
However, the possibility of a mentally retarded person receiving a death sentence in
Kansas never changed. Id.
84. See id. (noting that states without a death penalty are no less a part of the
nation than states with death penalties).
85. See Eichel, supra note 7, at A15 (noting that at conference in Chicago, Scalia
voiced his underlying opinion that any punishment permitted when the Bill of Rights
was established, was by definition constitutional, now and forever). “It means today
not what current society, much less the Court, thinks it ought to mean, but what it
meant when it was adopted.” Id. But see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12
(2002) (writing that the excessive punishment standard should not be judged by the
standards that prevailed at the time of the Bill of Rights’ adoption, but rather by
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”).
86. See Juvenile Death Penalty, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 4, 2002, at B6 (explaining
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E. Purposes Underlying Capital Punishment
The majority’s pivotal argument was the finding of a national
consensus, but the opinion also stressed that mentally retarded
offenders should not be sentenced to death, because their execution
does not reflect the purposes underlying capital punishment.87 Even
if the majority opinion found the evidence to be insufficient to
constitute a national consensus, it would still be within the Court’s
power to find such executions unconstitutional.88
Instead of
addressing the issue of a national consensus, the Court could have
held that the mentally retarded, as a class, do not contain the
necessary characteristics or underlying purposes for permitting the
use of capital punishment.89
Interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
includes punishment that does not measurably further the two goals
of capital punishment: retribution and deterrence.90 Justice Brennan
advanced these arguments in Penry v. Lynaugh91 and Stanford v.
that without an examination of evolving standards slavery would still exist and women
would not have the right to vote); see also Anne Gearan, Execution of Retarded
People Ruled Out, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, June 21, 2002 at 1A (noting that if it were
not for evolving standards under the Eighth Amendment, it would still be considered
acceptable to flog people in public).
87. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (“This consensus unquestionably reflects
widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders,
and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served
by the death penalty.”).
88. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 (highlighting that punishment is unconstitutional
if it “makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence
is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering”).
89. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835-38 (holding that the imposition of the death
penalty on persons under the age of sixteen is unconstitutional based on the reduced
culpability of a juvenile and the fact that such a penalty does not adequately reflect or
contribute to the essential purposes underlying capital punishment); see also Dwight
Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 159 (1998) (stating that
the Court looks to a number of factors in its determination of whether a class of
defendants should be exempt from capital punishment: the evolving standards of
decency, the excessiveness of the penalty, and whether deterrence or retribution will
be achieved). But see Penry, 492 U.S. at 338 (O’Connor, J.) (stating that all mentally
retarded offenders do not inevitably “lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity
to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty”).
90. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (reporting that executions that do not serve one or
both of the social purposes are unjust and unconstitutional); see also John Blume &
David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment
Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 737-38 (1988) (noting that retribution and deterrence
are the two social purposes served by the death penalty, and a punishment that does
not further those purposes can constitute “cruel and unusual” punishment).
91. 492 U.S. 302, 343-49 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that,
notwithstanding the national consensus argument, the Court should have ruled that
executing the mentally retarded was unconstitutional because such executions were
disproportionate and would not advance the goals of deterrence or retribution). The
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Kentucky.92
1. Retribution
The concept of retribution recognizes that the severity of the
punishment depends on the level of the offender’s culpability.93 If
the state does not impose the death penalty on all average murderers
it surely should not be allowed to execute individuals who are less
culpable by virtue of their mental state.94 The Court has repeatedly
identified four principles to examine when determining whether an
individual’s behavior is sufficiently culpable to warrant a death
sentence.95 First, capital punishment is employed on offenders who
act rationally, purposefully, and deliberately.96 Second, capital
punishment is appropriate only for one who has the capacity to
evaluate the consequences of his conduct.97 Third, the punishment
of death is sufficiently related to an individual’s personal culpability,
only when he or she can fairly be expected to conform to the
“impairment of a mentally retarded offender’s reasoning abilities, control over
impulsive behavior, and moral development” limits the offender’s culpability so that
the death penalty is disproportionate, and thus an unconstitutional punishment. Id.
at 346.
92. 492 U.S. 361, 403-04 (1989) (recognizing that justification for execution and
retribution depends on the degree of an offender’s culpability and understanding).
93. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (highlighting that “[t]he heart
of retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender”); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 409 (1986) (stating “we may seriously question the retributive value of executing
a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of
his fundamental right to life”).
94. See Joseph A. Nese, Comment, The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An
Examination of the Propriety of Their Execution Under the Eighth Amendment, 40
DUQ. L. REV. 373, 379 (2002) (reporting that the diminished capacity to control
impulsive behavior and to develop moral reasoning of a mentally retarded offender
makes them less blameworthy); see also Brief for Petitioner at 33, Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452) (noting that executing persons with mental
retardation cannot fulfill the goal of retribution given the diminished level of
personal culpability of defendants with mental retardation).
95. Brief for Petitioner at 26, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 008452).
96. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 825-26 n.23 (noting the death penalty “takes as its
predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent”); see also Tison, 481 U.S.
at 156 (stating that this predicate is grounded in the principle that the more
purposeful the criminal conduct, the more seriously it ought to be punished);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (reporting the death penalty is only an
appropriate punishment for those who act with deliberation or premeditation);
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835 n.43 (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate
for those with an immature, undeveloped sense of reason or those without the
capacity to make a fully reasoned choice).
97. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 333 (holding that a death sentence in the case of a
person with severe or profound mental retardation is inappropriate because such
persons are “wholly lacking in the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their
actions”).
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behavior of a responsible, mature citizen.98 Furthermore, the death
penalty is proportionate only when a defendant’s individual
culpability and personal responsibility warrant the sanction of death.99
Executions of persons with mental retardation do not coincide with
these principles.100
2. Deterrence
“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon
the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out wrongful conduct.”101 Capital
punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of
premeditation and deliberation.102 Executing persons with mental
retardation will not measurably further the goal of deterrence because
such persons have cognitive and behavioral impairments.103
By allowing executions of persons with mental retardation, the
death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which call for a less
severe penalty. Although the majority in Penry highlighted that
mental retardation could be used as a mitigating factor, the Court
failed to acknowledge that mental retardation itself poses a barrier to
a successful showing of mitigation.104 This barrier is apparent in the
98. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 n.11 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that children who commit murder are not as culpable as adults because
they are less mature and responsible and often have less capacity to control their
conduct).
99. See Tison, 481 U.S. at 149 (noting the importance of individual culpability in
capital punishment); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (stressing
that the Court insists on “individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement
in imposing the death sentence”).
100. See AAMR I, supra note 36, at 15, 40 (reciting that individuals with mental
retardation do not have the same capacity as others to make reasoned choices,
because of their diminished intelligence). Their diminished intelligence also makes
them less able to appreciate the consequences of their actions and to act at a mature
and responsible level. Id.
101. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
102. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (stressing that imposing the threat of the death
penalty will not deter someone who has no intention to kill).
103. See Nese, supra note 94, at 379 (noting that deterrence involves the
defendant’s “capacity to understand and control his wrongful behavior”). A person
with mental retardation cannot be deterred, because he lacks the ability to predict the
consequences of his behavior and does not possess the ability to learn from the
consequences of someone else’s wrongful actions. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner at
33, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452) (recognizing that “the
inability to imagine and assess competing courses of action is a core aspect of mental
retardation”). This limitation significantly reduces the ability of mentally retarded
persons to engage in the reasoning process, on which the notion of deterrence is
predicated. Id.
104. See Brief for Petitioner at 34, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 008452) (noting that several factors have demonstrated a heightened risk of receiving
the death penalty, despite the assurance advanced in Penry that defendants with
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existence of false confessions,105 lack of ability to give meaningful
assistance to counsel,106 and overall appearance as poor witnesses.107
F. Weaknesses, Strengths, and Surprises
Justice O’Connor declared in Penry that the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded made a measurable
contribution to the penological goals of deterrence and
retribution.108 She contradicts this reasoning when she adopts the
majority opinion in Atkins.109 Additionally, although the Court
discussed the lack of culpability of mentally retarded defendants, it
did not propose that they go unpunished for their crimes.110 It
weakened the majority’s argument to suggest in one sense that
defendants with mental retardation can still be held culpable for their
crimes but to discuss the likelihood of false confessions.111 It is
mental retardation can plead their disability in mitigation).
105. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577, 584 (Va. 1984) (noting
that defendant Earl Washington, a man with an IQ of sixty-nine, confessed to a
crime). DNA evidence later revealed that Washington was in fact innocent. Jim
Lobe, Rights: U.S. Supreme Court Bans Executions for Mentally Retarded, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, June 20, 2002. See also Baker, Death-Row Inmate Gets Clemency;
Agreement Ends Days of Suspense, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at A1 (highlighting
that a person with mental retardation on death-row unwittingly confessed to a crime
he did not commit); American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities, Death Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of
the Death Penalty in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 487, 528 (2002) (mentioning
that mentally retarded defendants “are prone to false confessions because of
susceptibility to suggestion”). Such defendants are inclined to tell an authority figure
what they think that person wants to hear. Id.
106. See ROSA EHRENREICH & JAMIE FELLNER, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY
AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 1, 4 (Malcolm Smart & Cynthia Brown
eds., Human Rights Watch 2001) (noting that a mentally retarded person will often
attempt to conceal his condition from lawyers, not realizing that his condition could
constitute a major part of his defense).
107. See Nese, supra note 94, at 383 (stating that a person with mental retardation
“tends to alienate the jury by sleeping, smiling or staring at nothing while in the
court”).
108. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 306 (asserting that she could not conclude that all
mentally retarded people, by virtue of their mental retardation alone, “lack the
cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability
associated with the death penalty”).
109. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305 (holding that the execution of the mentally
retarded will not measurably further the two goals of capital punishment: retribution
and deterrence).
110. See id. at 317 (stressing that the Court was not advancing a lack of
punishment for these individuals, rather it held they just shouldn’t receive the most
severe form of punishment). Pursuant to narrowing jurisprudence, which ensures
that only the most culpable offenders receive the death penalty, executions of persons
with mental retardation should be excluded based on their diminished culpability.
Id. at 318.
111. See id. at 320 (noting that the risk of imposing the death penalty despite
factors which require a less severe punishment is heightened by false confessions).
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understandable that the Court would not want to establish a blanket
rule that would eliminate punishment altogether for defendants with
mental retardation. However, by discussing evidence of diminished
capacity in capital murder cases, one could make an argument that
there is a lack of criminal intent to justify even a life sentence.
The Commonwealth of Virginia made a valid argument by claiming
that a per se rule excluding all mentally retarded defendants
contradicts the standard testing procedures which requires an
individualized assessment of deficient functioning.112 However, a
stronger argument is that the Atkins decision is flexible enough to
provide for individual assessments, but acknowledges that persons
with mental retardation share basic qualities that render them less
culpable.113
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not correlate the age capacity
of a person with mild mental retardation to that of a juvenile.114 If
they had, the Thompson v. Oklahoma prohibition of executing
persons under the age of sixteen would have required that those with
the mentality of a child not be subject to execution.115
112. See Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 320 (arguing that it is not enough to merely look at
a person’s IQ score). A court must also consider an individual’s adaptive functioning
abilities. Id.; see also KATHY SWEDLOW, DOES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BAR EXECUTING
MENTALLY RETARDED PRISONERS CONVICTED OF CAPITAL OFFENSES? 281 (2002) (stating
that notwithstanding an individual’s IQ score, a diagnosis of mental retardation
under the DSM-IV, a test used to determine mental retardation, requires an analysis
of the individual’s “concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive
functioning”).
113. See AAMR I, supra note 36, at 5 (stating that persons with mental retardation
share the basic quality of significantly subaverage intellectual functioning).
114. See SADOCK & SADOCK, supra note 35, at 2598 (defining a person with mild
mental retardation as having an IQ between fifty and sixty-nine, and a mental age
between nine and twelve); see also Penry, 492 U.S. at 339 (reporting that “[m]ental
age is ‘calculated as the chronological age of nonretarded children whose average IQ
test performance is equivalent to that of the individual with mental retardation’”).
115. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 352 (noting that the Court did not rely on Thompson
in its reasoning to support its holding); see also Claire Goldstein, Mental Retardation
and the Death Penalty Debate, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE (2001) (citing that no state
imposes the death penalty on children ages nine to twelve), available at
http://www.journalism.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/00-8452line.html
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2004); see also Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding
Implementation of the American Bar Association’s Recommendations and
Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on
Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 46 (1996) (commenting that if “a child
of ten or eleven years of age should not be executed under any circumstances, then
surely a person who may have a chronological age of twenty, but a mental and
emotional age of ten or eleven, should not be put to death”). But see Penry, 492 U.S.
at 339 (mentioning that courts have been reluctant to rely on the concept of mental
age as a basis for exculpating a defendant because the concept is imprecise). It does
not adequately account for individuals’ varying experiences, ceases to change after a
person reaches the age of fifteen or sixteen, and could have a disempowering effect if
applied to mentally retarded persons in other areas of the law. Id. at 306.
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G. Predictability of Justices’ Decisions
The Atkins decision is unique considering that the Rehnquist Court
has been quite determined to protect the interests of the states against
encroachments by the federal government.116
Justice Stevens’
decision condemning executions of persons with mental retardation
was predictable considering he is the only member of the Penry
dissent still on the Court.117 Similarly, the dissenting opinions of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were not unexpected,
considering they found that eighteen states did not establish a
national consensus in Thompson.118 Also, these justices have
indicated that they are unwilling to examine whether the punishment
of defendants with mental retardation is proportionate and/or
advances the criminal goals of deterrence and retribution.119
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer were not on the bench when
Penry was decided.120 However, their decisions were predictable,
considering they hold similar views with Justice Stevens regarding the
Eighth Amendment and capital sentencing proceedings.121
Nevertheless, their decisions were not as predictable as those of
Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas because they had not
ruled prior to Atkins on a decision regarding a “national consensus”
116. See Kenneth W. Starr, The Anthrax Term, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2002, at A12
(opining that the Atkins decision was unusual because it made states abide by a
categorical determination); see also Editorial, Review and Outlook, WALL ST. J., June
21, 2002, at A8 (criticizing the Atkins decision on the basis that the Supreme Court is
not a legislative body).
117. See Entzeroth, supra note 3, at 934 (highlighting that Justice Stevens, in his
dissent of Penry, did not discuss a national consensus, but held that execution of the
mentally retarded was a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
118. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 867 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & White, J.
dissenting) (claiming that eighteen states did not provide a sufficient number to form
a national consensus barring the infliction of the death penalty on a class of
defendants).
119. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (noting that an analysis of whether application of
the death penalty to mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth Amendment
because it is grossly disproportionate and makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment has no bearing on Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence). If an objective examination of laws and jury determinations fails to
demonstrate society’s disapproval of the punishment, the punishment does not
violate the Eighth Amendment, even if it is not in accordance with penological goals.
Id.
120. See id. at 303, 341, 349-350 (stating that Penry was decided by Justices
O’Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and
Kennedy).
121. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1191-92 (2003) (Stevens, J.,
Souter, J., Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J. dissenting) (asserting that a sentence imposed
under California’s three strike rule violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment; see also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,
168-78 (1997) (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., Souter, J. & Stevens, J. dissenting) (finding
that fundamental errors occurred during capital sentencing procedures).
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in the context of the Eighth Amendment, nor do they consistently
agree with Justice Stevens on cases raising Eighth Amendment
claims.122
The two surprise votes that made the Atkins decision so
unpredictable came from Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, the
modest conservatives, known as the perennial “swing votes.”123 Justice
Kennedy’s decision was unusual considering he did not find a
national consensus in Stanford v. Kentucky124 and refrained from
voting in Thompson v. Oklahoma.125 Justice O’Connor’s decision
was less shocking because she noted in Penry that the Court would
reconsider the constitutionality of executing persons with mental
retardation if a national consensus emerged.126 Considering there
was a thirteen-year lapse of time between Penry and Atkins, it is likely
that Justice O’Connor believed that the rapid movement of sixteen
states banning executions of the mentally retarded established a
“national consensus.”127 However, her voting record seems to
contradict that notion, because her decisions on past Eighth
Amendment cases reveal reluctance in finding a national
consensus.128 She, like Justice Kennedy, joined the dissent in
Stanford, but unlike Kennedy, O’Connor joined a plurality opinion
that exempted juveniles under the age of sixteen from the death
penalty.129 Justice O’Connor agreed with the case’s holding but
122. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 505, 515 (1995) (noting that Justice
Stevens dissented while Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the majority’s
holding that the “Eighth Amendment does not require the State to define the weight
the sentencing judge must accord an advisory jury verdict”).
123. See Victoria Ashley, Comment, Death Penalty Redux: Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s Role on the Rehnquist Court and the Future of the Death Penalty in
America, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 407, 414 (2002) (noting Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
are deemed the “swing votes” in the battle between the three conservative Justices:
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas; and the four liberal Justices: Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer).
124. 492 U.S. at 382-391 (holding that a national consensus had not been
established because, of the thirty-seven states which permitted capital punishment,
fifteen declined to impose it on sixteen-year-olds and twelve declined to impose it on
seventeen-year-olds).
125. 487 U.S. at 818, 848, 859 (stating that Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White decided Thompson). Justice
Kennedy did not participate in the decision. Id. at 815.
126. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
127. See Hall, supra note 54, at 367 (noting that as soon as McCarver became
moot, the court granted certiorari to Atkins); see also Borromeo, supra note 12, at
198 (recognizing that it is unlikely the Supreme Court would grant certiorari to
Atkins if their objective was simply to restate the holding of Penry).
128. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (declaring that sixteen states’ prohibition of
executions of the mentally retarded did not constitute a national consensus).
129. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-49 (plurality opinion) (holding that eighteen
states’ prohibition of executions of juveniles established a national consensus).
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adopted a reasoning that did not reflect the finding of a national
consensus.130 However, the fact that Justice O’Connor, a consistent
supporter of the death penalty, criticized the administration of the
death penalty signaled a shift in her thinking that made her decision
in Atkins more plausible.131
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND AFTERMATH OF ATKINS
A. Implications
The immediate impact of the Atkins decision was that Daryl Atkins’
life was saved.132 More broadly, the decision could be the most
sweeping limitation on capital punishment since the Supreme Court
restored the death penalty in 1976.133 A major implication of the
Atkins decision is the placement of death penalty jurisprudence
under critical review.134 Since the Court made such a strong rule,
However, Justice O’Connor was “reluctant to adopt this conclusion as a matter of
constitutional law.” Id. at 849. Rather, she took the unusual approach of concluding
that the state legislature had not intended by its silence to include fifteen-year-olds
among those criminal defendants who were eligible for the death penalty. Id.
130. See id. at 857-58 (asserting that the fact that eighteen legislatures had banned
the execution of individuals under sixteen meant that a national consensus
forbidding the practice most likely exists, but this conclusion should not
unnecessarily be adopted as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence
than what is before the court).
131. See A Justice’s Doubts, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at B12, (noting that Justice
O’Connor delivered a speech in which she expressed “serious questions” about
whether the death penalty is fairly administered); see also Ross Douthat, Judging
O’Connor, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, July 9, 2001, (commenting that while Justice
O’Connor has traditionally supported individual states’ rights to choose the
implementation of the death penalty, recent public statements seem to indicate that
her position may be wavering), available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/nr_comment/nr_comment070901b.shtml
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2004); see A Justice’s Doubts, L.A. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at B12, (noting
that Justice O’Connor delivered a speech in which she expressed “serious questions”
about whether the death penalty is fairly administered); see also Ross Douthat,
Judging O’Connor, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, July 9, 2001, (commenting that while
Justice O’Connor has traditionally supported individual states’ rights to choose the
implementation of the death penalty, recent public statements seem to indicate that
her
position
may
be
wavering),
available
at
http://www.nationalreview.com/nr_comment/nr_comment070901b.shtml
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2004).
132. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that it is unconstitutional to take the life
of a mentally retarded offender, which precludes the Commonwealth of Virginia
from executing Atkins).
133. See Bruce Shapiro, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Politicians and Courts are
taking their Cues from Growing Public Opposition, THE NATION, July 22, 2002 at 14
(noting the decision could save the lives of three hundred other inmates with mental
retardation on death row).
134. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (describing how the world community
disapproves of the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders). Justice Stevens included this footnote citing to an amicus brief
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banning a whole class of defendants from death penalty prosecution,
the Court may shift its focus to the inhumane dynamic of capital
punishment as a whole. Although a national moratorium of the death
penalty seems unlikely, the fact that six of the nine justices on the
Court restricted the eligibility of candidates for the death penalty is an
encouraging sign.135 Justice Stevens specifically opened the door to
increased anti-death penalty litigation when he wrote, “we cannot
ignore the fact that in recent years a disturbing number of inmates on
death row have been exonerated.”136
Another highly publicized implication is the potential for a flood of
defendants claiming mental retardation in order to evade capital
punishment.137 Especially for the inmates on death row, states are
predicting a great deal of litigation regarding mental capacity.138 In
addition to that increased litigation, Justice Scalia fears that offenders
will try to feign their mental capabilities to avoid capital punishment,
filed by the European Union. Id. By citing the European Union, rather than a
similar argument made by retired U.S. diplomats, the majority opinion invited further
constitutional expression from death-penalty opponents abroad. Id.
135. See David Von Drehle, Does Ruling Signal Shift in Thinking?, WASH. POST,
June 25, 2002, at A01 (commenting that that the Atkins decision was the closest thing
to a road map the court has ever provided to abolitionists). See also Shapiro, supra
note 134, at 14 (asserting that the initiatives for moratoriums in more states, which
Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr. proposed and Senators Feingold and Corzine
endorsed, are ripe for support).
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 n.25; see also Anne Gearan, Court Bans Death Penalty
for Retarded: Such Executions Amount to Cruelty, the Supreme Court Ruled, THE
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 21, 2002, at A1 (noting that death penalty concern has
increased with the recent exonerations based on DNA evidence and questions
regarding the quality of appointed attorneys). Two states, Illinois and Maryland, have
put executions on hold as a result of these concerns. Id. But see Marcia Coyle, A
Tale of Two Justices, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 2002, at 9 (noting that death
penalty opponents should not automatically infer positive implications from the
Atkins decisions because, in that same year, the Court decided in Mickens v. Taylor
and Bell v. Cone against providing relief or reversals for ineffective counsel in capital
cases).
137. See Mary Alice Robbins, Some Say Flood of Atkins’ Claims Will Slow
Executions, TEX. LAWYER, July 22, 2002, at 4 (reporting a Texas District Attorney’s
comment that she expected to see an influx of pleadings from death row inmates
claiming to be mentally retarded). However, a Texas defense lawyer stated he does
not expect a flood because defense attorneys will not advance theories that have no
empirical proof as support. Id.
138. See Gearan, supra note 137, at A1 (citing that nationwide, an estimated 10%
of the more than 3,700 inmates on death row are mentally retarded); see also Richard
Lacayo, Spared by Their Low IQ; the Supreme Court Bars Execution of the Mentally
Retarded. But Which Death-Row Inmates Will Qualify?, TIME, July 1, 2002, at 34
(reporting that 50 of the 213 condemned killers in North Carolina have petitioned
for retrial based on their mental capacity, and at least 20 of the 455 death-row inmates
in Texas will raise mental deficiency claims); see, e.g., Alexis Gilbert, Trying to Define
Retarded After Atkins Prosecutors, Defenders Predict a Wave of Motions, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, July 9, 2002, at 1 (commenting that Pennsylvania will most likely
experience a wave of litigation because experts estimate that 10% of death-row
inmates are possibly mentally retarded).
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thereby burdening and undermining the judicial system.139 However,
Justice Scalia’s concern is misplaced because establishing mental
retardation requires the assessment of authentic IQ scores, school
reports, childhood test scores, and other evidence indicative of
intellectual and adaptive problems that manifest before the age of
eighteen.140
Mentally retarded defendants do not generally
accentuate their disability; rather they try to overcompensate for their
limited cognitive abilities.141 In addition, studies suggest that only 13% of the population has an IQ between seventy to seventy-five and
lower.142 Justice Scalia’s argument is also unpersuasive because a
concerned state can implement stricter procedures to combat possible
abuse.143
A major implication of the Atkins decision is the reconsideration of
the death penalty for persons between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen.144
Since the Court acknowledged the diminished
culpability of a mentally retarded offender based on his or her
139. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the Court’s
decision will turn death penalty trials into “a game,” in which criminals fake mental
retardation). Justice Scalia declared that the symptoms of mental retardation “can be
readily feigned.” Id.; see also Lane, supra note 78, at A01 (noting that death penalty
supporters claim the Court has “opened the door to hundreds of phony claims of
retardation, each of which would take years to litigate”).
140. See Bing, supra note 83, at 90 (noting that a defendant who has not been
diagnosed before the age of eighteen may not retroactively claim the mental
retardation exemption); see also Emily Heller, Faking Retardation to Escape Death
Penalty Isn’t Likely, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., July 5, 2002, at 8 (asserting that in
order to fake mental retardation effectively one would have to begin in elementary
school).
141. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 428, 430 (1985) (noting that persons with
mental retardation are unlikely to refuse to answer questions that are beyond their
ability and tend to overrate their skills in order to resist the stigma that accompanies
the label of retardation); see also Virginia G. Wilson, Penry v. Lynaugh: Mentally
Retarded Defendants and the Death Penalty, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 345, 348 (1990)
(recognizing that a criminal defendant with mental retardation often is able to hide
his disability from untrained individuals around him).
142. See SADOCK & SADOCK, supra note 35, at 2952.
143. See Bing, supra note 83, at 90 (reporting that some states require the
defendant to prove his mental retardation by either a preponderance of evidence
standard or clear and convincing evidence standard). Also, states can require that
their own independent psychiatrists examine the defendant. Id.
144. See Juvenile Death Penalty, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 4, 2002, at B6 (mentioning
that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer are advocating for a review of the law that
allows juveniles to receive the death sentence); see also Jim Lobe, Rights: U.S.
Supreme Court Bans Executions for Mentally Retarded, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 20,
2002 (noting that the Missouri Supreme Court halted the execution of a juvenile who
was convicted of murder while awaiting the outcome of Atkins); Anthony Mauro,
Historic Ruling Bans Death Penalty for Retarded, THE RECORDER, June 21, 2002, at 1
(noting that Steven Hawkins, executive director of the National Coalition to Abolish
the Death Penalty, suggests the decision “could energize the effort to abolish the
death penalty for juveniles”).
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individual capacity, a similar argument could apply to juveniles.145
Also, the Atkins decision raises the question of whether the nation has
reached a consensus about prohibiting the execution of juveniles.146
The decision provides a significant precedent for the Court to
reevaluate its position on juvenile executions.147
Although the Court generally hesitates to define specific
procedures to follow, in order to abide by a ruling, it is important for
the court to set some standard guidelines.148 The Court erred by
leaving this responsibility to the sole discretion of the states.
Although general statutory definitions conform to clinical definitions,
the Supreme Court could have stressed that all states conform to
those definitions.149 By leaving this question open with no mention
of the type of standard necessary, a drastic difference may emerge in
the states’ standards for declaring someone mentally incompetent.
Consequently, the courts may need to revisit this issue. Additionally,
states that do not support the Court’s decision may delay passage of
corresponding legislation.150
States will have to grapple with drafting legislation that provides
either a broad definition of mental retardation or encompasses
145. See Juvenile Death Penalty, supra note 145, at B6 (asserting that the similarity
between mentally retarded people and youthful offenders is that neither class of
individuals can be held fully accountable for their actions); see also John Blume &
David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: an Eighth Amendment
Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 750 (1988) (highlighting that the cognitive disabilities
of a mentally retarded person are similar to the inexperience and lack of knowledge
that a juvenile possesses).
146. See Charles Lane, Four Justices Oppose Executing Juveniles, WASH. POST, Oct.
7, 2002, at A3 (stating that the federal government and sixteen of the thirty-eight
states that permit capital punishment ban executions of persons under age eighteen).
However, since 1989, the year Stanford v. Kentucky was decided, only two states have
enacted laws prohibiting such executions. Id.
147. See Roper v. Simmons, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (2004) (accepting cert on the issue of
whether executions of juveniles under the age of eighteen are prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment).
148. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that
the Court had to define “promptness” for the purposes of a probable cause hearing
for a warrantless arrest).
149. See James J. Kilpatrick, Court’s Term Ends - Uneventfully, TULSA WORLD, July
12, 2002 (revealing Justice Stevens’ acknowledgment that determining which
offenders are mentally retarded is difficult, and that experts disagree on exact
determinations of mental capacity). Justice Stevens’ opinion did not clarify a method
for the states to follow; rather, he encouraged the states that permit such executions
to develop appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon executions
of the mentally retarded. Id.
150. See John Council, The Penry Predicament How Should Texas Handle Mental
Retardation Claims in Capital Cases, TEX. LAWYER, July 15, 2002, at 1 (stating that
Texas is not in a rush to pass legislation in compliance with the Atkins decision).
State Representative Pete Gallego commented that, based on past experience, he did
not expect death penalty reform to be a priority during the legislature’s next term.
Id.
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specific IQ levels. Both approaches have flaws because an overly
broad definition could permit too much jury discretion, whereas a
specific IQ level could encourage much debate between experts over
the defendant’s degree of mental retardation.151
Atkins is a significant decision because, unlike Thompson, a
majority of the Court found a national consensus amongst the
legislation of eighteen states.152 The Court distinguished this
seeming inconsistency by noting that the number of states does not
establish a national consensus per se, but rather the consistency in the
direction of change establishes a consensus.153 The introduction of
this argument forced the Court to consider the number of states,
timing of legislation, and the surrounding factors impacting
legislation in its national consensus determination. This is a serious
departure from past decisions where the Court has sought to
incrementally introduce violations of the Eighth Amendment, based
on overwhelming evidence of a national consensus.154
B. Recommendations
With the Supreme Court providing little guidance on how states
should implement legislation in compliance with the Atkins decision,
lawmakers should look to the states that have enacted laws prohibiting
the execution of defendants with mental retardation for guidance.155
States should implement a definition of mental retardation that is in
151. See Hall, supra note 54, at 360 (asserting that in order to reduce bias and
prejudice in capital punishment cases, juries must be given guidance and objective
standards when applying the law in death penalty cases). But see Bing, supra note 83,
at 73 (noting that IQ tests are not always accurate because the testing procedure and
the identity of the tester factor into the determination of an IQ). Any bias the tester
may have against the subject will affect the applicant’s score because intended
meaning, as interpreted by the tester, counts in scoring. Id.; see also Nese, supra note
94, at 376 (reporting that the revised definition of the AAMR still uses IQ scores but
emphasizes the importance of culture and environment in properly identifying and
classifying mental retardation).
152. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15.
153. See id. at 314-15 (noting that sixteen states have established legislation
barring executions of the mentally retarded since Penry).
154. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71 (holding that fifteen of the thirty-seven states
that permit capital punishment did not establish a national consensus); see also Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that twenty-six states established a
national consensus).
155. See Janet Elliott, ‘It All Comes Down to Definition’/States Grapple with
Implementing Ban on Executing Retarded, HOUS. CHRON., June 22, 2002, at 19
(noting that states have generally agreed to implement the traditional definition of
mental retardation in their laws, but disagree on specifics). For example, “Kentucky,
Maryland, New Mexico, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tenessee and Washington look to
an IQ level of seventy or below as evidence of mental retardation.” Id. Arkansas,
however, sets the level at sixty-five or less. Id. Kansas and Colorado use a widely
accepted definition of mental retardation but do not specify an IQ level. Id.
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accordance with the traditional and widespread definition cited in the
opinion.156 In furtherance of that definition, courts can and should
provide further specifications to avoid confusion.157 A beneficial
method would set a specific IQ level at seventy, but also indicate that
the IQ test is not the only criterion to examine when establishing a
finding of mental retardation.158
Procedurally, an accused should raise his mental retardation as a
factor barring execution before the trial.159 A judge should have the
option of deciding during the pre-trial process if the accused is
mentally retarded. However, as a check on the judge, a jury should
have sole discretion in ascertaining an accused’s mental status during
the trial.160 The states should implement a standard of proof that
requires the defendant to prove his or her mental retardation by a

156. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing two definitions provided by the AAMR
and the American Psychiatric Association). A characteristic of mental retardation is:
“significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” as well as significant limitations in
adaptive functioning in at least two skill areas. Id. In addition, the onset of mental
retardation must occur before age eighteen. Id.
157. See, e.g., Marie Price, Mental Disabilities Ruling Spurs Call for New Hearing,
J. REC. (Okla. City), Sept. 5, 2002 (stating that a defendant in Oklahoma bears the
burden of proving he or she is mentally retarded, and the court will not consider
mental retardation unless the defendant has an IQ of seventy or below). But see
Elliott, supra note 157, at 19 (noting that including a specific IQ level could lead to a
battle among experts because IQ tests have subjective components).
158. See Bing, supra note 83, at 140 (recommending that in addition to an IQ
score, “court-appointed professionals should also examine the defendant’s history of
limitations in adaptive skill areas [when] making a diagnosis”).
159. See id. at 141 (explaining the three reasons behind this recommendation).
“First, if the pre-trial hearing determines that the defendant merits a death penalty
exemption, a death-qualified jury [a procedure whereby jury members that are
categorically opposed to the death penalty are removed] would not be necessary.” Id.
This would strengthen the jury system because it would allow more people to serve as
jurors. Id. “Second, even if the defendant loses his claim in a pre-trial hearing, he
can still present evidence of his mental retardation at trial.” Id. This safeguard would
be lost if the hearing occurred after the defendant had been convicted. Id. at 142.
Finally, if the sentencing jury is the only body to determine a suspect’s mental
retardation, they may incorrectly assume the trial jury already considered the option
and choose not to disagree with them. Id.
160. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees a trial by jury, means that only the jury, not the judge,
has the power to decide upon the aggravating factors necessary to sentence a capital
defendant to death); see also Elliott, supra note 157, at 19 (referring to the Texas
Governor’s veto of language that would bar executions for the mentally retarded
because the proposed law would have enabled a judge to ignore a jury-imposed death
sentence if he determined the defendant was mentally retarded). This procedure
would undermine the jury system. Id.
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preponderance of the evidence, rather than the more difficult
standard of clear and convincing evidence.161
In the field of experts, a court should appoint independent
psychologists specialized in the area of mental retardation.162 The
court should also require evaluations from more than one mental
health professional in order to provide a safeguard against erroneous
test results.163
CONCLUSION
The Court has approached the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” by examining the
public’s evolving standards of decency.164 An examination of state
legislatures is an objective measure of those evolving standards.165
The Court looks to those legislative enactments to determine whether
the states have reached a national consensus that would prohibit a
particular punishment as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.166
By noting dramatic trends in legislation barring executions of
persons with mental retardation, the Court, in Atkins v. Virginia,
correctly determined that the states have reached a national
161. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 60 (2d ed. 1995) (noting
that generally a defendant who has the burden of proof for an element of a defense
need only prove the facts supporting the claim by a preponderance of the evidence);
see also Bing, supra note 83, at 144-45 (recognizing that to impose a clear and
convincing standard would be unjust given that affirmative defenses invoke lower
standards). Imposing a higher degree of proof for an affirmative defense than what
the civil law standard requires places a further burden on the mentally retarded
defendant. Id. This is unfair because mentally retarded defendants already have a
high burden given that they are “more susceptible to police coercion and to forced
waiver of procedural rights,” and they have difficulty communicating effectively with
their lawyers. Id.
162. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARD 73.11 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that standards require professionals providing expert
testimony to have substantial training and expertise in mental retardation); see also
Bing, supra note 83, at 142 (commenting that independent, court-appointed
psychologists are more objective and decrease arguments between experts because
the personality of the expert becomes less important than the facts of the case).
163. See Bing, supra note 83, at 143 (arguing that the appointment of experts
provides a safeguard that will lead to a decrease in appeals based on inaccurate
determinations of mental retardation, which will then defray the costs of appointing
mental health experts).
164. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (indicating that “cruel
and unusual” punishments are “not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire new
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice”).
165. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822-23 (remarking that Eighth Amendment
analysis has consistently gauged evolving standards of decency through the actions of
legislatures, which provide a significant indication of whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual).
166. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 331 (stating that legislations passed by the states are
objective indicators of a national consensus).
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consensus deeming such executions to be in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.167 In addition, the Court recognized that individuals
with mental retardation should not receive the death penalty because
their executions do not serve the purposes underlying capital
punishment.168 At a time when the nature of capital punishment is
highly controversial, the Atkins decision marks an important turning
point in death penalty jurisprudence. The Court’s judgment not only
limits the scope of the death penalty on a class of defendants, but it
also opens the door to additional constitutional scrutiny of this
nation’s severest form of punishment.

167. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 313-15 (holding that the consistent direction of change,
as evidenced in sixteen states adopting prohibitions of executions of persons with
mental retardation since Penry, establishes a national consensus).
168. See id. at 319 (noting that the underlying purpose of the death penalty is
retribution and is thus reserved for only the most culpable offenders). Imposing the
death penalty on the mentally retarded, however, does not serve this retributive
purpose because their intellectual and adaptive skills are so deficient that their ability
to understand the nature of their crime is diminished. Id. Furthermore, states
cannot hope to deter mentally retarded individuals through the death penalty
because they sustain cognitive and behavioral impairments that inhibit their capacity
to comprehend and control their wrongful behavior. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2004

29

